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2Immigration and Trust in Politics in Britain
Abstract
This paper argues that a previously overlooked explanation for varying individual-levels
of political trust is concern about immigration. Focusing on the case of Britain, where
levels of opposition to immigration have remained high since the 1960s and yet the
implications of such opposition are still unclear, this paper examines the effect of
concern about immigration on political trust. Using the pre- and post-election panel
component of the 2005 British Election Study and the 2002-3 European Social Survey,
we illustrate that after controlling for a wide range of other predictors of trust in politics,
concerns about the impact of immigration significantly affect political trust. In addition,
in 2005 the perception that government had not handled the issue of immigration
effectively also significantly affected political trust, with both linear and interactive
effects.
3In the decades since the end of the Second World War, one of the most pressing and
divisive issues that has come to dominate the political agendas of western democracies is
immigration, with most European publics expressing unease with migration to their
countries. However, the range of potential implications of concern about immigration
are not very well known. In some European countries, one of the most obvious
implications is the rise of extremist, anti-immigration parties; this paper considers
another potential consequence of public concerns about immigration, reduced political
trust. Specifically, focusing on the British case where the consequences of concern about
immigration are less obvious than in many other European countries, the paper examines
the relationship between concern about immigration and trust in politics.1 Determining
whether such a connection exists is important because trust in politics is thought to be
crucial to effective policymaking and compliance with government regulations.2 It is
also important because many conceptualizations of system support include notions of
community, 3 particularly positive orientations of citizens toward one another and toward
political elites and the political system. Thus, understanding what produces trust and
distrust is important, as is understanding how perceptions of newcomers affect feelings
of political community generally. Although we have some understanding of the causes
of political distrust, this paper contends that an additional piece of the puzzle of public
distrust may be immigration, and particularly perceptions that migration is undermining
the national community on which many believe democratic political institutions were
built. The implications of the paper’s findings are of considerable importance because
they point to the conclusion that rather than being an inconsequential sentiment in a
country like Britain, the consequences of public worries about immigration are
4potentially very serious indeed, in that such concern is likely to be one of the forces
undermining trust in the British political system, and thus feelings of political
community more generally.
The next section conceptualizes the dependent variable in this study—political
trust—and outlines why concerns about migration are likely to be related to political
trust; the section ends by proposing three specific hypotheses. The following section
then explains why the British case is of particular interest and tests the proposed
hypotheses using the panel component of the British Election Study of 2005. These
results are compared to the 2002-3 European Social Survey. The latter is then further
explored using an instrumental variables approach. The findings from all of these
analyses provide support for the main contention of this paper: concerns about
immigration do appear to be undermining the functioning of the British political system
by reducing levels of political trust.
Political Trust, Identity and Immigration
This paper is concerned with the relationship between perceptions of immigration and
perceptions of the political system, particularly political trust. This section outlines what
is meant by ‘political trust’ in this paper and then discusses reasons why concern about
immigration is likely to explain some of the variation in political trust. It then presents
three specific hypotheses about the relationship between concern about immigration and
political trust before proceeding to test these in the next section of the paper.
Political Trust
5For some scholars, expressions of trust in a political institution are declarations that on
average the agents operating within those institutions will prove trustworthy4 or that the
democratic institutions serve to select relatively trustworthy agents. 5 Miller and
Listhaug argue that political trust ‘is a summary judgment that the system is responsive
and will do what is right even in the absence of constant scrutiny’.6 David Easton
highlighted the importance of political community in maintaining stable political
systems, arguing that political systems are thought to be prone to failure if political
community is lacking—that is, if individuals in the system are not ‘sufficiently oriented
toward one another’ and willing to support the existence of a group of individuals who
can negotiate and settle differences.7 That is, amongst other things, stable political
systems rely on a basic level of interpersonal connection and trust as well as some
degree of trust in elites and institutions running the system. As will be explained below,
it is our contention that immigration is likely to pose problems for this notion of political
community, thereby potentially undermining support for the political system.
Also of relevance here is Easton’s distinction between diffuse and specific system
support.8 Easton conceptualizes diffuse support as a deep-seated set of attitudes toward
politics and the political system that is relatively impervious to change. On the other
hand, specific support is related to the actions and performance of government or
political elites. The assumption is that short-term policy failures should not directly
erode diffuse regime support or support for the political community as a whole.
While this conceptual distinction may seem fairly clear, measuring diffuse versus
specific support for the political system is less than straight-forward. When we ask
citizens whether they have trust or confidence in their national parliaments, presidencies,
6or governments, are we measuring their attitudes to the current set of leaders and
policies or more general orientations to these institutions and elites?9 Comparative
analyses of survey questions pertaining to attitudes to government indicate that while
there is overlap in individual-level perceptions of current authorities and attitudes to
other aspects of the political system—e.g., its institutions—perceptions of institutions
appear to be empirically distinct from perceptions of current government officials.10
This paper is especially concerned with general orientations to political institutions
and elites, and assumes—based on the above-mentioned comparative analyses—that
indicators of trust and confidence can validly tell us something meaningful about these
general orientations. Given that such items are, in fact, likely to tap into both types of
support, in order to try to reduce the likelihood that our findings solely pertain to
specific support, we (a) include multiple indicators of political trust; (b) control for
known strong predictors of specific support; and (c) investigate the effects of concern
about immigration on attitudes to the political system across multiple surveys.
The Relationship Between Concern About Immigration and Political Trust
Most international relations scholars would argue that modern states—particularly
modern European states—were built upon notions of shared identity and values. Some
scholars believe that the creation of common identity resulted from modern advances in
transportation and printing, both of which are fairly important for the creation of a
common language, which is, in turn, important for the articulation of common values
across a large territory.11 Others believe there may have also been an active attempt on
the part of state leaders to construct such an identity.12 Still others contend that common
7identity across large territories originates from a primordial human need for connection,
and that modernization produced a transposition of notions of family (and particularly
super-family) onto others living within state territory.13 Many of these hypotheses imply
a considerable amount of artificiality in the construction of national identities. Anthony
Smith, however, contends that although the creation of the modern nation-state was
made possible by economic and bureaucratic modernization (and particularly one key
component of modernization—mass education), ‘the presence of a core ethnie around
which strong states could be built’ made the creation of nations possible.14 That is, such
states have been built around shared cultural heritage and norms.15 Evidence also
indicates that these identities, including their civic, ethnic and cultural components are
still extremely relevant to citizens of European countries, including Britain.16 Moreover,
research on social identities has long pointed to the conclusion that identities—even
artificially constructed laboratory-based identities—are meaningful to individuals
because they contribute positively to self-esteem and self-image and because they help
to provide clarity in a complex, confusing world.17 The inference is therefore that long-
established identities like national identities are even more relevant and powerful, no
matter how artificial they may appear to the outside observer. Immigrants pose clear
threats to these identities by bringing with them seemingly different values and ways of
life; they are also perceived to threaten the economic resources of fellow countrymen
and -women.18 Particularly in countries like Britain in which the main myths of identity
have not tended to include the myth of being accepting of migrants (compared to the
myths of identity in the United States, for instance19), it may be unclear to many citizens
as to how to reconstruct identity to incorporate newcomers. Newcomers who may be
8perceived as holding extremely different values from those of natives—Muslim migrants
vis-à-vis a predominantly secular Britain, for instance—may be particularly difficult to
reconcile with existing national identities.
The difficulty of coming to terms with new migrants, in turn, has potential
implications for political systems. As noted above, political systems are thought to be
prone to failure if there is an absence of political community—to reiterate, if individuals
in the system are not ‘sufficiently oriented toward one another’ and willing to support
the existence of a group of individuals who can negotiate and settle differences.20 Some
research into social capital has already come to the conclusion that immigration and
multiculturalism may create problems for the former of these conditions (i.e., orientation
toward one another), although it must be noted that the evidence is somewhat mixed.21
Immigration, and more specifically, perceptions of migration, may also create problems
for the latter—i.e., the willingness to support the existence of a group of individuals who
can engage in policymaking—and reduce willingness to support the institutions through
which these groups of elites govern. This is because feelings of disunity are not likely to
apply solely to feelings of citizens for one another but are also likely to stretch to
feelings about the elites in this community and the way the community is governed as
well. Indeed, evidence indicates that individuals tend to be increasingly less favourable
toward using the institutions of the state to reduce poverty and provide welfare as a
result of perceptions of cultural differences between groups who access these services.22
Moreover, systems like the British political system and its notions of political equality
are argued to have been layered onto pre-existing cultural connections;23 a perceived
9weakening of these cultural connections because of immigration is also likely to
subsequently weaken attachment to this political system.
In short, it is clear that immigration creates widespread concern about political
and social community and about social identities. Moreover, under pre-mass-
immigration conceptualizations of national identity, the institutions through which elites
governed the national polity were designed to govern and adjudicate between members
of the national community. When individuals perceive that immigration has threatened
that community the institutions that govern them are likely to be called into question.
That is, those most attuned to the effects of immigration on the national community may
question the extent to which national political institutions exist to represent a national
citizenry. Moreover, it is likely that individuals specifically blame their political elites
and institutions for allowing large-scale migration in the first place and thus hold these
elites and institutions in contempt as a result. While some of the prior research discussed
above hints at the connection between immigration and perceptions of political systems,
there is not yet an investigation of this relationship. The analysis here takes a first step in
filling this gap. We examine three specific micro-level propositions regarding the
relationship between immigration and trust in politics:
Hypothesis 1 Those expressing most concern about the impact of immigration on
the national community will be least trusting of politicians and
political institutions.
Hypothesis 2 Those who believe the government has done a poor job of handling
immigration will be least trusting of politicians and political
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institutions.
Hypothesis 3 The relationship between concern about immigration and perceptions
of government handling of immigration will be interactive: those who
are most concerned about immigration and believe the government has
handled the immigration issue poorly will be the least trusting of
politicians and political institutions.24
Immigration and Political Trust in Britain: The Analysis
As mentioned above, in many European democracies, one of the most obvious results of
large-scale immigration has been expression of anti-immigration sentiment via extremist
parties such as the Front National in France, the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands
(and in the 2002 and 2003 elections, Lijst Pim Fortuyn), or the Freedom Party in Austria
and the more extreme Freedom Party breakaway party, the Alliance for the Future of
Austria. In these cases, immigration-related concerns gain some expression in the
‘legitimate’ political institutions by achieving representation in these institutions,
including becoming part of governing coalitions. The UK political system, in contrast,
provides very few institutional outlets for the expression of concern about immigration,
despite the fact that anti-immigration is fairly strong there.
For instance, even as early as the 1960s, roughly 85 per cent of British citizens
felt that too many immigrants had been let into the country.25 In the 1990s,
approximately 65 per cent in Britain thought that immigrants abused the system of social
benefits and that schools suffered where there were more immigrants.26 The 2003 British
Social Attitudes Survey indicated that 75 per cent of respondents were in favour of
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increased immigration restrictions, while the 2008 British Social Attitudes Survey
indicated that 65 per cent of Britons believed immigration was a threat to their national
identity.27 Ipsos/Mori poll data also indicate that since the late 1980s a majority in
Britain think too many migrants have been let into the country.28 In the 2009
Transatlantic Trends: Immigration survey, more than 60 percent of Britons stated that
immigration was more of a problem than an opportunity, the highest of all countries
included in the survey (the other countries were France, Germany, Italy, Canada, U.S.,
Netherlands, and Spain). The highest percentages of individuals claiming that
immigrants take jobs from the native born and that immigration negatively affects
national culture were found in Britain in that survey as well, and similar percentages
were noted in the 2008 version of this survey.29 Although it was traditionally assumed
that Britain had less difficulty in reconciling immigration with national identity because
British identity was predominantly civic in nature, evidence indicates that British
identity also still has strong ethnic and cultural components,30 which make inclusiveness
toward immigrants and immigration extremely difficult. In addition, while level of
concern about immigration has always been high amongst the British public, the past
decade has witnessed even larger-scale net migration to the UK, including a rise in the
numbers of asylum seekers, along with rising uneasiness with Muslim migrants and
minorities.31 Thus, for the reasons discussed in the previous section, it seems very likely
that such concerns would have a considerable impact on perceptions of the functioning
of the British political system.
However, while parties like the BNP and UKIP attempt to attract votes on the
basis of public concern about immigration, most voters in the UK will not vote for either
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of these parties in general elections, presumably because they realize neither of these
parties has any realistic chance of winning enough votes to win even a single
parliamentary constituency, much less enough seats to take part in government (although
it must be noted that this could change if there is large-scale reform of the electoral
system, as proposed by the current governing coalition). Although the BNP had begun to
make some headway in local government elections in places like Yorkshire, Lancashire,
and East London as well as in the 2009 European parliamentary elections, despite
fielding an unprecedentedly large number of candidates in the 2010 general elections the
party still failed to win even a single seat in the national parliament and only attracted
2.1 per cent of the popular vote, an increase of 1.2 percentage points on the 2005 general
election.
In addition, while mainstream centre-right parties in other parts of Europe have
provided an additional outlet for anti-immigration sentiment by co-opting the platform
and rhetoric of the far-right (as is the case periodically in France, for instance), in the
UK the two dominant political parties have often held relatively similar policy positions
on immigration, making it difficult for citizens to vote on this particular issue.32
Specifically, both major parties have traditionally claimed to want to stem the flow of
migration to the UK while simultaneously supporting policies to protect those already in
the UK from discrimination.33 Thus, distinguishing between the two parties on the issue
of immigration may at times pose some difficulty for British citizens. Also of
importance is that both parties appear to be somewhat divided on the issue of
immigration, with former Labour officials such as David Blunkett previously speaking
fairly negatively about immigration and immigrants34 and more recently Frank Field,
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Margaret Hodge, John Denham, Jon Cruddas, and Anne Cryer (amongst others)
engaging in ‘tough talk’ on immigration , on the one hand, and Conservative party
members expressing unease over the introduction of immigration or race into party
rhetoric, on the other—although it must be noted that Labour is more internally divided
over this issue than the Conservatives.35 Even when the issue is specifically introduced
by the Conservative Party in an election—as in 2005—it appears that other variables,
such as leadership qualities and performance on policies other than immigration, are
likely to be more important in explaining vote choices.36 This paper suggests that while
immigration-related worries may have a limited impact on electoral outcomes in Britain,
they may still affect the British political system by reducing trust in British politicians
and political institutions for the reasons noted above: immigration is perceived as
weakening the connection between citizen, on the one hand, and institutions and
politicians, on the other, because of perceived threat to national community. Moreover,
as also noted above, politicians and institutions are likely to be blamed for failing to
adequately control immigration.37
Analysis 1: The 2005 British Election Study (BES)
As discussed above, we are interested here in perceptions of the political system as a
whole and thus examine trust in multiple components of this system. In particular, we
incorporate an indicator of trust in the key elected political institution in Britain, the
national parliament. We also include an indicator of trust in politicians. In addition, we
include an indicator of trust in an unelected institution, the police. Because these items
are strongly connected to one another and scale very well and because prior research
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also indicates that they ought to be strongly connected to one another, 38 they have been
combined into a single index of political trust, which ranges from 0-10, with high values
representing higher levels of political trust (see Appendix A for question wording and
scaling information). It was also expected that the combination of items would capture
the systematic diffuse support component of political trust. It should be noted, though,
that we have also examined the predictors of each item individually and the results are
very similar to those reported below; that is, on the whole, the predictors of trust in the
elected institution (parliament) and elected individuals are similar to the predictors of
trust in our unelected body, the police, indicating that the findings are likely to pertain to
general system support rather than solely to specific support for particular incumbents.
Prior research on perceptions of political systems and incumbents points to a
wide range of potential explanations for individual-level differences in these
perceptions, which we incorporate here. Echoing the major 1980s and 1990s electoral
studies’ refrains of ‘It’s the Economy, Stupid’ and drawing on Easton’s model of the
political system in which (perceived) outputs of the system are likely to produce short-
and long-term effects on perceptions of the system as a whole, many researchers have
pointed to the role of economics in explaining differences in individual-level and
aggregate-level perceptions of political institutions and incumbents. Thus an economy
that is performing poorly or perceptions that the national economy or one’s own
personal economic circumstances are declining (or are likely to decline) have all been
argued to affect attitudes to political institutions and politicians, at least in the short-
term.39 Perceptions of the functioning of political institutions are also important: if
governments are perceived to be fair and open, if politicians can be held accountable,
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and if individuals perceive governments to be performing well along various policy
dimensions, individuals are more likely to have favourable attitudes to political
institutions and elites, again, at least in the short-term.40 Thus, levels of trust in politics
are likely to be connected to the manner in which institutions function and whether
citizens perceive governments to be performing well. More recently, scholars have
linked distrust in politics to social capital, including voluntary and other informal
participatory networks and interpersonal trust.41 This paper does not attempt to analyze
the causality of this relationship, but simply introduces controls for social capital in the
multivariate models below. Analyses also point to the effects of being electoral
‘losers’—i.e., voting for a party that fails to get into government—and indicate that
electoral losers may lose some degree of confidence in the political system in the short-
term.42 The analysis below incorporates these potential explanations of variation in
system support. As discussed above, it is expected that with these several indicators of
specific support included in the model—particularly winning and losing, perceptions of
government handling of specific policy areas, and perceptions of the economy—at least
some of the remaining covariation between concerns about immigration and political
trust is likely to be relevant to diffuse support.
This paper makes strong claims about the impact of immigration on trust in
British politics. Because of the strong claims being made, our primary aim in the
analysis is to make the tests of our propositions as difficult as possible so that any
evidence found in support of these propositions will be robust. We have tried to ensure
robustness by introducing the strong controls noted above. We also investigate our
propositions specifically using the British Election Study of 2005, which includes a short
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panel component. We take advantage of this panel component of the 2005 BES in order
to help reduce the likelihood of (a) spurious relationships and (b) potential endogeneity
problems. First, we incorporate a lagged dependent variable—that is, the respondent’s
level of political trust at t-1, which is measured in the BES pre-election survey
conducted between February and April 2005.43 This variable should help to reduce
omitted variable bias, providing a control for any predictors of political trust that are not
controlled for via other independent variables. Second, our indicators of concern about
the impact of immigration and perceptions of government handling of immigration will
be measured at t-1 while all other controls (perception of government handling of other
policy areas, economic perceptions, etc.) will be contemporaneous. With the
incorporation of a lagged dependent variable and lagged expressions of concern about
immigration and perceptions of government handling of immigration, any significant
relationship that is found is highly likely to run in the hypothesized direction rather than
the reverse (that is, concern about immigration predicts political trust rather than the
reverse). Thus, because of the desire to control for lagged level of trust and for the many
controls mentioned above, the 2005 BES is the best available recent data set for
conducting this analysis.
We begin by estimating the simple model of:
Political Trust t = β0 + β1Political Trust t-1 + β2Concern about Immigration t-1 +
β3Perception of Government Handling of Immigration t-1 + β4 Concern about
Immigration t-1 * Perception of Government Handling of Immigration t-1 + ei
(Equation 1)
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That is, political trust as measured in the post-election study will be predicted by
political trust in the pre-election survey, concern about immigration in the pre-election
survey, perceptions of government handling of immigration, also in the pre-election
survey, and the interaction between the latter two. We have incorporated two separate
indicators of concern about the impact of immigration—one of these measures concern
about the effect of immigration on culture and the other measures concern about impact
of immigration on natives’ jobs.44 Appendix A provides the question wording for these
variables and Table 1 provides the estimates of coefficients for Equation 1.
[Table 1 about here]
Model 1 tests Hypotheses 1 and 2 and the results indicate that concern about the impact
of immigration on culture and perceptions of government handling of immigration both
have independent effects on political trust. Concern about the impact of immigration on
the jobs of natives appears to have no statistically significant effect on political trust.
Given that our argument about the relationship between immigration-related worries and
political trust revolved around notions of shared national culture, it is perhaps
unsurprising that it is such concerns that have an impact on political trust. It is worth
reiterating that the effects reported in Table 1 are the effects of concern about
immigration and perceptions of handling of immigration by government even after
including a lagged dependent variable in the model, and using lagged levels of concern
about immigration. Model 2 of Table 1 tests the interactive effect of Hypothesis 3 and
the results also provide support for this hypothesis. Again, the effect is only present for
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concern about the impact of immigration on culture, not jobs. We revisit this
relationship below.
As discussed above, in order to help further ensure robustness, we control for the
wide range of variables found to be related to attitudes to the political system or its
incumbents in previous literature which were outlined briefly above: retrospective and
prospective personal and national economic evaluations, evaluations of government
performance across several policy areas (crime, health service, terrorism, the economy,
and taxation), social capital (interpersonal trust and participation in voluntary
organisations), and loser versus electoral winner status. Following the work of
Anderson45 and Rohrschneider46, we also incorporate controls for education, age,
gender, and income.47 We introduce an additional control for left-right self-placement as
an indicator of general ideological predisposition, as this is likely to be connected to
both attitudes toward immigration and distrust of national political institutions, with
those identifying with the far-right being most hostile toward immigration and toward
national political institutions. Dummy variables are also included for Scotland and
Wales. Note that all of these variables are measured contemporaneously, and thus our
lagged independent variables will be competing against these contemporaneous
measures. Again, this is done to help ensure a high level of robustness if the
immigration-political trust relationship finds empirical support. In addition, the 2005
election took place at a time of heightened concern about Britain’s involvement in Iraq
and so we control for approval of involvement in the war.48 Furthermore, as outlined
above, the model incorporates a lagged dependent variable—that is, self-reported level
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of trust in the two institutions and politicians in the pre-election survey. Measures of all
variables are provided in Appendix A, and the equation we estimate is as follows:
Political Trust t = β0 + β1Political Trust t-1 + β2Concern about Immigration t-1 +
β3Perception of Government Handling of Immigration t-1 + β4 Concern about
Immigration t-1 * Perception of Government Handling of Immigration t-1 + β5
Sociotropic retrospective economic evaluations t +  β6 Sociotropic prospective economic
evaluations t +  β7 Pocketbook retrospective economic evaluations t +  β8 Pocketbook
prospective economic evaluations t +  β9Perception of Government Handling of Issues t
+ β10Interpersonal Trust t + β11Participation in Voluntary Activities t +  β12Voted for
Party Other than Labour t +  β13Voted BNP t +  β14 DidNotVote t +  β15Education t +
β16Age t +  β17Female t +  β18Income t +  β19Left-right self-placement t +  β20Scotland t +
β21Wales t +  β22IraqApproval t + ei (Equation 2)
Table 2 provides the coefficients for this equation, and these generally confirm
the findings from the simple models in Table 1. That is, concern about the impact of
immigration on culture, perceptions of government handling of immigration, and the
interaction between these variables all appear to be statistically significant predictors of
political trust. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the relationship between
immigration concerns, perception of government handling of immigration, and political
trust.49 The graph indicates that the impact of perceptions of government handling of
immigration on political trust is stronger for those who believe immigrants have not
contributed to British culture, while for those who believe immigrants have contributed
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to culture, the impact of perceptions of government handling of immigration is very
limited. As noted above, the reported effect of the former is based on lagged indicators
of these independent variables and incorporates a control for lagged level of political
trust. Figure 2 also illustrates the marginal effects of concern about immigration on
political trust, depending on the level of perceived mishandling of immigration by
government, including the standard errors around these effects.50 The bands around the
effects line indicate that we cannot have as much confidence in the effects at the highest
levels of perceived government mishandling of immigration but the illustrations
generally provide support for the interactive hypothesis. It is also worth noting that even
without the interaction, concern about the impact of immigration on culture and
perceiving government to have mishandled the issue were both independently related to
political trust (i.e., in the non-interactive model). Thus, the evidence seems to suggest
that perceptions of immigration are indeed affecting perceptions of government
institutions and officials. It is also important to note that the relationship between
attitudes to the impact of immigration on culture and perception of government handling
of immigration on political trust was roughly similar across the three indicators of the
dependent variable to the results reported here. That is, the interaction between concern
about immigration and perception of poor handling of immigration appears to affect
perceptions of the unelected institution, the police, as well as perceptions of parliament
and politicians, again lending support to the notion that the relationship found here
pertains to general system support.
[Table 2 and Figures 1 and 2 about here]
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Immigration-related concerns are, of course, not the only strong predictors of
political trust. Perceptions of government handling of other issues, economic
evaluations, interpersonal trust, left-right self-placement, and approval of Britain’s
involvement in Iraq, as well as being an electoral loser, also predict political trust.
However, the immigration variables are amongst the stronger predictors, despite not
being measured contemporaneously. These findings support the propositions raised
above: that worries about the impact of immigration on national culture and blaming the
government for allowing increased immigration combine to create a group of citizens
who are distrustful of their politicians and political institutions. Further implications of
these findings will be discussed in the conclusion.
We have also analyzed the relationship between concern about immigration,
perceptions of mishandling of immigration, and respect for politicians and political
institutions using the 2001 British Election Study (analysis not shown).51 In some ways
the results mirror those from the 2005 survey; namely, of the two indicators of concern
about immigration, only concern about the cultural impact of migration achieves
statistical significance by usual social science standards (i.e., p ≤ 0.05). In addition, the 
size of the effect of this variable on respect for politicians and institutions was somewhat
larger than that in the 2005 analysis, with an unstandardized coefficient more than twice
the size of the coefficient in the 2005 analysis. On the other hand, the impact of
perceptions of government handling of immigration on respect was not statistically
significant in the multivariate model. Thus, in 2001 perceptions of mismanagement of
immigration did not yet translate into negative perceptions of institutions and politicians.
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Moreover, there was no apparent interactive effect in 2001. Thus the multivariate
analyses based on the 2001 election survey results appear to indicate that concern about
the impact of immigration was having an effect on attitudes to politicians and
institutions in 2001, but that perceptions of government mishandling of migration were
not yet playing a significant role in predicting attitudes to politicians and institutions.52
Analysis 2: The 2002-3 European Social Survey (ESS)
Because the above analyses were conducted on data collected immediately before and
after general elections, it is possible that the results are unusual. It is thus important to
attempt to investigate the results in differing circumstances. The 2002-3 European Social
Survey was chosen for these purposes. This ESS was conducted shortly prior to the start
of the unpopular war in Iraq (the final set of interviews was conducted in February 2003,
and the Iraq War began 20 March 2003) and outside of the context of a general election;
it was also conducted prior to the large-scale influx of immigrants after the 2004 EU
enlargement. This survey does not contain a panel component, nor does it contain the
wide array of questions on perceptions of government handling of specific policies,
including perceptions of government handling of immigration or asylum, nor the entire
range of questions about economic perceptions included in the BES. Thus we control for
as many of the other predictors of political trust as possible, given these data limitations.
As with the BES analysis, we have combined the indicators of political trust to
create a single 0-10 index (see Appendix B for question wording and scaling
information). Unfortunately, no questions were asked pertaining to perceptions of
government handling of immigration or asylum and so Hypotheses 2 and 3 cannot be
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investigated. Instead, we provide a simple analysis of the relationship between concern
about the impact of immigration on the national community and political trust,
controlling for interpersonal trust, voluntary participation, the electoral loser effect,
perceptions of the national economy, perceptions of one’s personal economic situation,
age, education, income, gender, and left-right self-placement (see Appendix B for
measures of these variables).
Table 3 presents the model for political trust in the British portion of the ESS.
After controlling for the above-mentioned variables, the coefficients for concern about
immigration achieve statistical significance, with a maximum impact of 1.5.53 It must be
noted that in contrast to the BES results, the indicators of concern about the impact of
immigration on culture and on jobs both achieve statistical significance, although the
effect of the latter is half the size of the former. The fact that the indicator of concern
about the economic impact of immigration is significant in the ESS analyses and not
significant in either of the BES analyses could be a result of a few factors. First, the
immigration items in the ESS are measured on 0 to 10 scales rather than 1 to 5 scales, as
is the case with the BES items. Also, the question about the impact of immigration on
jobs is more balanced in the ESS than in the case of the BES (see Appendices A and B),
which may have drawn out more nuanced views, which in turn, affected responses to
political trust questions differently. Finally, all items are measured within the same
survey in the ESS. It is thus possible that the contemporaneous effect of concern about
jobs illustrated in Table 3 dissipates over time, but the more consistent and powerful
identity-related effect remains even after several months, as shown with the BES
analysis.
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[Table 3 about here]
In order to confirm that these findings are not limited to the early part of the last
decade, we have also investigated a model similar to that in Table 3 for the most recent
round of the ESS (Round 4), which was fielded in Britain between September 2008 and
January 2009 (analysis not shown). The results confirm that by 2008-9 concern about
immigration was still having an impact on political trust. It is also important to note that
we have analyzed the effect of concern about immigration and each of our three
indicators of political trust separately in the ESS, as was the case with the BES analyses,
and the results are similar to those reported here. That is, concern about immigration
affected attitudes to parliament, the police, and politicians, indicating that the effects
were not limited to elected institutions and politicians. Generally, then, these ESS results
provide further confirmation of a connection between concern about the impact of
immigration and political trust.
Analysis 3: The 2002-3 ESS, An Instrumental Variables Approach
It is possible that perceptions of political institutions explain concern about migration,
rather than the reverse, as has been hypothesized in this paper; it is also possible that
both of these perceptions respond to other factors which have been omitted from the
models here. In addition, it is also possible that our measures of concern about
immigration are measured with error. If these three problems exist, the OLS estimates
reported above are biased and inconsistent. The extent and direction of the bias depends
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on the relative importance of each of these problems. If the main problem is that the
direction of causality is reversed from what is hypothesized, OLS estimates are likely to
overestimate the impact of concern about immigration. On the other hand, if random
measurement error is the main problem, OLS estimates are likely to underestimate the
impact of concern about immigration.
One solution to these problems is to use instrumental variables for potentially
endogenous regressors—in this case, concern about immigration. An instrumental
variables approach requires that we identify measures that are correlated with concern
about immigration but otherwise uncorrelated with trust in institutions. That is, the
instruments must have a significant partial correlation with concern about immigration
controlling for all other exogenous determinants of political trust, while being
uncorrelated with the error term.54
Thus, in order to further investigate whether causality runs in the direction
hypothesized in this paper—i.e., whether concern about immigration does indeed affect
perceptions of government institutions and politicians—we examine this relationship
using an instrumental variables approach. Ideally, we would prefer to use this approach
on the BES analyses but these surveys were not designed to understand attitudes to
immigration and finding instruments for the immigration variables in the BES data sets
was impossible. The ESS 2002-2003 questionnaire was, however, designed explicitly to
investigate perceptions of immigration (amongst other things), and so finding adequate
instruments for our indicators of attitudes to immigration is more likely with this survey.
Because of the difficulty of finding separate instruments for the two indicators of
concern about migration used in the ESS analyses above, and because both indicators
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have statistically significant effects on political trust and are strongly correlated to one
another (Pearson’s r=0.62), we have combined the two to create a measure of general
concern about the impact of immigration. We have then searched for instruments for this
index, focusing first on variables that should theoretically be related to concern about
immigration but are not directly related to political trust. One of the key instruments that
we use for concern about immigration is contact with immigrants in the form of
friendships. A considerable body of research indicates that this form of contact has
consistent, strong effects on attitudes to outgroups, including immigrants and
minorities.55 Feelings about having an immigrant as one’s boss are also strong indicators
of social distance and are significantly related to attitudes to immigration in the ESS.
Other significant predictors of concern about immigration include expectations
regarding qualifications for migration, namely that migrants speak the official language
of the country, that they are committed to the way of life of the country, and that they be
white. There is no theoretical reason to expect these variables to be directly related to
political trust, but they ought to be (and are) related to general concerns about
immigration. In order to further strengthen the instrument, we searched this data set for
other variables that were strongly related to concern about immigration but not directly
related to political trust. Several indicators of perceptions of where migrants come from
were strongly related to the former but not to the latter, and these are incorporated as
part of the instrument for concern about immigration (see Appendix C).
In order to investigate whether our instruments are significantly correlated with
the potentially endogenous regressor, concern about immigration, we analyze the effect
of the instruments on concern about immigration controlling for all exogenous variables
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that were included in the analysis in Table 3. The aim is to determine whether the
instruments are significantly correlated with concern about immigration and have the
anticipated signs, controlling for the included exogenous variables in the model. The
results of this analysis are shown in Table 4. The coefficients on the instruments do
indeed have the correct signs and are jointly significant. This is evaluated using the F
statistic for the excluded instruments, which is 42.84 (significant at the p ≤ .001 level). 
This is clear evidence that the instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressor
and thus satisfy the assumption that the selected instruments are relevant.56
[Table 4 about here]
Table 5 provides the OLS estimates from the model in Table 3 using the
instrumental variable in place of concern about immigration. The results confirm those
in previous sections: concern about immigration has a significant effect on political trust.
We now turn to the conclusion to discuss the implications of these findings.
[Table 5 about here]
Conclusion
While concern about immigration has had clear effects on the political landscape of
Europe via the changing nature of European party systems, this paper contends that the
effects of such sentiment are also likely to be more subtle, operating via general feelings
about the political system and the political community as a whole. The paper illustrates
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these effects in the specific case of Britain. Successive periods of immigration in Britain
have been met with discomfort with being a country of immigration by ordinary citizens.
Prior research points to the conclusion that discomfort about immigration is rarely
related to personal economic self interest57 and instead stems from concern about the
effect of immigration on the national community and the threats that immigrants are
perceived to pose to this community, including those related to identity and economic
resources. This study indicates that such concerns may not be inconsequential in Britain
but may instead lead to a weakening of ties between the governed and the governors by
seemingly undermining the very basis on which such connections were originally
built—the common sense of shared myths, history, and culture. The potential
consequences of reduced political trust are considerable because as noted above trust is
crucial to effective policymaking, compliance with government regulations as well as
engagement in civically moral behaviour. Political trust is also thought to be crucial to
the representative relationship that lies at the heart of most democratic regimes.
Although it is difficult to state definitively that our findings pertain to diffuse support in
Britain, the evidence does point to the conclusion that across four different surveys
(including the 2001 BES and 2008-9 ESS) and multiple indicators of political trust in the
first decade of this century, feelings about the political system are very likely to have
been affected by public perceptions of immigration and in 2005, by perceptions
specifically of government handling of immigration. That is, the general findings are
very likely to pertain to diffuse support.
The findings may be of considerable relevance to the growing body of research
on the link between ethnic heterogeneity and trust. As noted above, the findings in this
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body of research are extremely mixed. The analysis here indicates that a potential
missing component from these analyses is the perceptual component. As indicated in
footnote 24, it is well-established that perception often fails to mirror reality and so
analyses that only incorporate actual levels of migration or diversity may fail to find
much effect precisely because perceptions are so very different from reality. We contend
here that it is the perceptions that are important in explaining political trust. They could
be important in explaining social trust as well. That is, perceptions of the negative
consequences of immigration or diversity could be eroding both political and social
communities upon which modern European democracies have been built.
While the most immediate response to the argument and findings presented here
may be the simple one of ‘closing the gates’, such a solution would not solve the
problem raised by this paper. Whether British citizens like it or not, Britain has become
a country of immigration and closing the gates would have no impact on the millions of
immigrants and their families and descendants who are already in the country and
consider it to be their home. Thus, perhaps an alternative solution is to revisit the
construction of British identity, with the aim of more clearly establishing what British
identity comprises and where the country’s millions of foreigners fit within this
construct. In addition, it is worth examining why concern about immigration is so much
lower in some countries (e.g., Finland and Sweden) and whether those countries have
adopted policies that might be relevant to British policymakers, such as rebuilding
notions of community based on economic equality. At the very least, it must be
recognized that immigration may be having long-term, unanticipated consequences for
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the functioning of the political system, which seem to require more open debate and
discussion.
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Appendix A: Measurement of Variables in Analysis 1 (BES 2005)
Note that all BES 2005 Post-Election question wording is available at
http://www.essex.ac.uk/bes/2005/Documents/BES05%20Postwave%20CAPI%20questi
onnaire.pdf, accessed 29 May 2009. The pre-election questionnaire is available at
http://www.essex.ac.uk/bes/2005/Documents/PreCAPIMay31.pdf, also accessed 29 May
2009.
Dependent Variable and Control Variable: Political Trust t and t-1 (pre- and post-
election questionnaire)
Now, thinking about British political institutions like Parliament, please use the 0 to 10
scale to indicate how much trust you have for each of the following, where 0 means no
trust and 10 means a great deal of trust.
And, how much do you trust the Parliament at Westminster? [bq20b]
And how much do you trust British politicians generally? [bq20c]
And how much do you trust the Police? [bq20d]
Cronbach’s alpha for these items for the pre-election questionnaire is 0.78 and for the
post-election questionnaire is 0.73. For both questionnaires, the items load onto single
factors, which explain 70.1 per cent of the variance (eigenvalue=2.1) in the pre-election
questionnaire and 66.8 per cent in the post-election questionnaire (eigenvalue=2.0). Each
set of items was thus combined by taking the average of the items, with the index
ranging from 0-10.
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Concern about the impact of immigration on the national community t-1 (pre-
election questionnaire)
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements:
Immigrants make Britain more open to new ideas and cultures. (Please take your
answers from this card.) 1 Strongly agree; 2 Agree; 3 Neither agree nor disagree; 4
Disagree; 5 Strongly disagree [aq45b]
Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Britain. (Please take your
answers from this card.) 1 Strongly agree; 2 Agree; 3 Neither agree nor disagree; 4
Disagree; 5 Strongly disagree [aq45g]
The coding of the second item was reversed, and so the high value of 5 represents the
strongest concern about the impact of immigration for both items.
Perception of Government Handling of Immigration t-1 (pre-election questionnaire)
How well do you think the present government has handled each of the following
issues? The number of asylum-seekers coming to Britain. 1 Very well; 2 Fairly well; 3
Neither well nor badly; 4 Fairly badly; 5 Very badly. [aq4c]
It must be noted that perceptions of government handling of the immigration issue is
measured here with an indicator of perceptions of government handling of asylum-
seekers. This item has been chosen because it is the only available indicator of
perceptions of government handling of an immigration-related issue in the BES data set.
Although there are clear legal distinctions to be made between ‘immigrants’ and ‘asylum
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seekers’, in the case of Britain—as pointed out by Joppke—there appears to be ‘a
zealous and instant equation of asylum seeking with immigration’,58 with British asylum
policy being structurally conflated with immigration control.59 Moreover, analyses of
survey data indicate that the vast majority of citizens of the UK prefer that economic
immigrants and asylum seekers be treated identically. For instance, in a Eurobarometer
poll from Spring 2000 (EB 53), over 70 per cent of British respondents would suggest
identical treatment for people coming from Muslim countries and Eastern Europe
seeking work as they would for asylum seekers.60 This is true even when the question
about asylum is posed in terms of individuals fleeing from serious internal conflict (e.g.
civil war).
Economic Evaluations t (post-election questionnaire)
Now a few questions about economic conditions.
[Sociotropic retrospective evaluations] How do you think the general economic
situation in this country has changed over the last 12 months? (Please take your answers
from this card.) 1 Got a lot worse; 2 Got a little worse; 3 Stayed the same; 4 Got a little
better; 5 Got a lot better [bq24]
[Sociotropic Prospective evaluations] How do you think the general economic situation
in this country will develop over the next 12 months? (Please take your answers from
this card.) 1 Get a lot worse; 2 Get a little worse; 3 Stay the same; 4 Get a little better; 5
Get a lot better [bq26]
[Pocketbook retrospective evaluations] How does the financial situation of your
household now compare with what it was 12 months ago? (Please take your answers
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from this card.) 1 Got a lot worse; 2 Got a little worse; 3 Stayed the same; 4 Got a little
better; 5 Got a lot better [bq23]
[Pocketbook prospective evaluations] How do you think the financial situation of your
household will change over the next 12 months? (Please take your answers from this
card.) 1 Get a lot worse; 2 Get a little worse; 3 Stay the same; 4 Get a little better; 5 Get
a lot better [bq25]
Perceived Political Performance t (Government Performance on Various Policy
Dimensions) (post-election questionnaire)
How well do you think the present government has handled each of the following
issues? Crime in Britain [bq3a]
The National Health Service [bq3c]
The risk of terrorism in Britain [bq3d]
The economy in general [bq3e]
The level of taxation [bq3f]
Each of these questions is asked in turn, with respondents given the following response
options: 1 Very well; 2 Fairly well; 3 Neither well nor badly; 4 Fairly badly; 5 Very
badly. Cronbach’s alpha for these items is 0.71, and they all load onto a single factor,
which explains 47.2 per cent of the variance in the items (eigenvalue=2.34). The items
were thus combined into a single index by taking the average of the items, with the
index ranging from 1-5.
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Social Capital: Interpersonal trust t (post-election questionnaire)
On balance, would you say that most people can't be trusted or that most people can be
trusted? Please use the 0 to 10 scale to indicate your view. (Please take your answers
from this card.) 0 Most people can't be trusted…10 Most people can be trusted [bq56]
Do you think that most people you come into contact with would try to take advantage
of you if they got the chance or would they try to be fair? Please use the 0 to 10 scale
again, where 0 means would try to take advantage and 10 means would try to be fair.
(Please take your answers from this card.) 0 Try to take advantage…10 Try to be fair
[bq57]
The correlation (Pearson’s r) between these two items was 0.61 and Cronbach’s alpha
was 0.75. Thus, these two items were averaged to create a 0 to 10 scale, with 10
representing the highest level of interpersonal trust.
Social Capital: Participation in Voluntary Activities t (post-election questionnaire)
Again, over the past few years, how active have you been in a voluntary organisation,
like a local community association, a charity, or a sports club? 1 Very active; 2
Somewhat active; 3 A little active; 4 Not at all active/Not involved [bq52]
Note that the coding of this item has been reversed.
Electoral Winning and Losing t (post-election questionnaire)
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Dummy variables were created for those who claimed to have voted for any party other
than Labour, for the British National Party, and for those who did note vote. Thus, the
comparison category is those who were the ‘winners’ (i.e., voted for the Labour Party).
Education t (post-election questionnaire)
Do you have any educational or work-related qualifications? 1 Yes; 2 No [bq82a]
IF ‘yes’ at [bq82a] Taking your answers from this card, which is the highest
qualification you have? Please just give me the number next to it. 1 Postgraduate degree;
2 First degree; 3 University/polytechnik diploma; 4 Teaching qualification; 5 Nursing
qualification; 6 HNC/HND, City&Guilds level 4, NVQ/SVQ 4/5; 7 A level and equiv; 8
Scottish Higher and equiv; 9 ONC/OND, City&Guilds level 3, NVQ/SVQ 3; 10 GCSE
A*-C, CSE grade 1, O level grade A-C; 11 Scottish Standard grades, Ordinary bands; 12
GCSE D-G, CSE grades 2-5, O level D-E; 13 City&Guilds level 2, NVQ/SVQ 2 and
equiv; 14 City&Guilds level 1, NVQ/SVQ 1 and equiv; 15 Clerical and commercial
qualifications; 16 Recognized trade apprenticeship; 17 Youth training certificate, skill
seekers; 18 Other technical, professional or higher qualification (WRITE IN)
This pair of questions was used to create dummy variables that would be equivalent to
the UK education variable in the European Social Survey. The categories represented in
that survey are as shown in Tables 2 and 3, with no qualifications as the omitted
category.
Age t (post-election questionnaire)
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Now, a few questions about yourself and your background. What was your age last
birthday? [bq77]
Gender t (post-election questionnaire)
INTERVIEWER TO OBSERVE AND RECORD: GENDER OF RESPONDENT
1 Male; 2 Female [bq76]
This variable recoded such that female=1 and male=0.
Income t (post-election questionnaire)
Which of the letters on this card represents the total income of your household from all
sources before tax - including benefits, saving and so on? Please just tell me the letter.
(CARD J4 19) 1 Q; 2 T; 3 O; 4 K; 5 L; 6 B; 7 Z; 8 M; 9 F; 10 J; 11 D; 12 H; 13 P [bq84]
The showcard looks as follows:
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(BES post-election questionnaire from
http://www.essex.ac.uk/bes/2005/Documents/BES05%20Postwave%20CAPI%20questi
onnaire.pdf, accessed 29 May 2009, p. 88.)
Left-right self-placement t (post-election questionnaire)
In politics, people sometimes talk about parties and politicians as being on the left or
right. Using the 0 to 10 scale on this card, where the end marked 0 means left and the
end marked 10 means right, where would you place yourself on this scale? (Please take
your answers from this card.) 0 Left; 1 one; 2 two; 3 three; 4 four; 5 five; 6 six; 7 seven;
8 eight; 9 nine; 10 Right [bq39a]
Approval of Britain’s Involvement in Iraq t (post-election questionnaire)
Please tell me whether you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly
disapprove of Britain's involvement in Iraq.1 Strongly approve; 2 Approve; 3
Disapprove; 4 Strongly disapprove [bq42] (coding reversed).
Appendix B: Measurement of Variables in Analysis 3 (ESS)
Note that all ESS question wording is available at
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/, accessed 27 July 2010.
Trust in Politicians and Political Institutions
Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I
read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete
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trust. Firstly…READ OUT [country]’s parliament? the politicians? the police?
Cronbach’s alpha for this set of items is 0.76, and they all load onto a single factor,
which explains 68.1 per cent of the variance in the items (eigenvalue=2.04). They were
thus combined by taking the average of the items, with the index ranging from 0-10.
Concern about the impact of immigration on the national community
And would you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by
people coming to live here from other countries? Cultural life undermined (0), Cultural
life enriched (10).
Would you say that people who come to live here generally take jobs away from
workers in [country], or generally help to create new jobs? Take jobs away (0) Create
new jobs (10).
The coding of each of these items was reversed.
Economic Evaluations
[Sociotropic evaluations]: On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of
the economy in [country]? Still use this card. Extremely Dissatisfied (0), Extremely
satisfied (10).
[Pocketbook evaluations] Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how
you feel about your household’s income nowadays? Living comfortably on present
40
income (1) Coping on present income(2) Finding it difficult on present income(3)
Finding it very difficult on present income(4).
Social Capital: Interpersonal trust
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be
too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means
you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted.
Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance,
or would they try to be fair? Most people would try to take advantage of me (0) Most
people would try to be fair (10).
Cronbach’s alpha for these items is 0.69 and the Pearson’s r between them is 0.52. The
items were thus by combined by taking the average of the items, with the index ranging
from 0 to 10.
Social Capital: Participation in Voluntary Activities
For each of the voluntary organisations I will now mention, please use this card to tell
me whether any of these things apply to you now or in the last 12 months, and, if so,
which. Respondents who claimed to participate in any of the organizations listed (or in
one not listed) were given a code of 1; those who do not participate in any activities
were given a code of 0.
Electoral Winning and Losing
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Dummy variables were created for respondents who claim to have voted for a party
other than Labour or who did not vote; the comparison category is the ‘winners’, or
Labour voters. Note that the survey did not include a separate category for the British
National Party and so no dummy variable was created for this category.
Other Controls
Education: What is the highest level of education you have achieved? Please use this
card. No qualifications (01) CSE grade 2-5/GCSE grades D-G or equivalent (02) CSE
grade 1/O-level/GCSE grades A-C or equivalent (03) A-level, AS-level or equivalent
(04) Degree/postgraduate qualification or equivalent (05) Other (WRITE IN) (06)
Age: In what year were you born?
Gender: coded by interviewer.
Income: Using this card, if you add up the income from all sources, which letter
describes your household's total net income? If you don't know the exact figure, please
give an estimate. Use the part of the card that you know best: weekly, monthly or annual
income.
Left-right self-placement: In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. Using
this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10
means the right?.
Appendix C: Measurement of Variables in Analysis 4 (Instrumental Variables)
The following variables were used to construct the instrument for the analyses in Tables
4 & 5.
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Do you have any friends who have come to live in [country] from another country? Yes,
several 1, Yes, a few 2, No, none at all, 3 [imgfrnd]
Now thinking again of people who have come to live in [country] from another country
who are of the same race or ethnic group as most [country] people, how much would
you mind or not mind if someone like this…. READ OUT…Not mind at all (0) …
Mind a lot (10) … was appointed as your boss? Please use this card for your answer.
[imdetbs]
Please tell me how important you think each of these things should be in deciding
whether someone born, brought up and living outside [country] should be able to come
and live here. Please use this card. How important should it be for them to …. be able
to speak [country’s official language(s)] [qfimlng]?... be white? [qfimwht ]… be
wealthy? [qfimwlt ]… be committed to the way of life in [country]? [qfimcmt]
Extremely unimportant (0)…Extremely important (10).
People come to live in [country] from other countries for different reasons. Some have
ancestral ties. Others come to work here, or to join their families. Others come because
they’re under threat. Here are some questions about this issue.
Thinking of people coming to live in [country] nowadays from other countries, would
you say that most are of the same race or ethnic group as the majority of [country]
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people (1) most are of a different race or ethnic group (2) or, is it about half and half (3)?
[imgetn]. Category 3 was recoded to 1.5.
Now thinking about people coming to live in [country] nowadays from other countries
within Europe, would you say that most come from the richer countries of Europe (1),
most come from the poorer countries of Europe (2), or, is it about half and half (3)?
[eimgrpc] Category 3 was recoded to 1.5.
And what about people who come to live in [country] nowadays from countries outside
Europe, would you say that most come from the richer countries outside Europe (1),
most come from the poorer countries outside Europe (2), or, is it about half and half (3)?
[imgrpc] Category 3 was recoded to 1.5.
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Table 1. Political Trust and Attitudes to Immigration, BES 2005 Results (Simple
Models)
Model 1 Model 2
b SE p b SE p
(Constant) 3.31 0.15 0.000 1.99 0.34 0.000
Political trust t-1 0.58 0.01 0.000 0.57 0.01 0.000
Concern about impact of immigration on culture t-1 -0.09 0.03 0.001 0.38 0.14 0.005
Concern about impact of immigration on jobs t-1 0.00 0.03 0.906 0.10 0.12 0.404
Government handling of immigration t-1 -0.14 0.03 0.000 0.19 0.08 0.022
Concern about culture*govt handling of
immigration t-1 -- -0.11 0.03 0.000
Concern about jobs*govt handling of immigration t-
1 -- -0.02 0.03 0.376
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.48
SEE 1.21 1.20
Note: coefficients are unstandardized OLS coefficients; see the text of the paper and Appendix A for the
description of the variables and question wording; N=2386.
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Table 2. Political Trust Political Trust and Attitudes to Immigration, BES 2005
Results (Full Model)
b SE p
(Constant) 2.28 0.42 0.000
Trust t-1 0.45 0.02 0.000
Immigration attitudes
Concern about impact of immigration on culture t-1 0.39 0.13 0.002
Concern about impact of immigration on jobs t-1 0.02 0.11 0.867
Government handling of immigration t-1 0.24 0.08 0.002
Concern about culture*govt handling of immigration t-1 -0.11 0.03 0.000
Concern about jobs*govt handling of immigration t-1 0.00 0.03 0.988
Economic Evaluations
Sociotropic retrospective 0.08 0.03 0.029
Sociotropic prospective 0.10 0.04 0.005
Pocketbook retrospective 0.02 0.03 0.561
Pocketbook prospective -0.07 0.03 0.043
Perceived Government handling of other issues -0.48 0.04 0.000
Social Capital
Interpersonal trust 0.09 0.01 0.000
Participation in voluntary activities -0.02 0.02 0.313
Electoral losers: Voted…
Party other than Labour -0.14 0.07 0.034
BNP -0.50 0.47 0.281
Did not vote -0.13 0.06 0.045
Other controls
Education
GCSE/O-level/CSE/NVQ1/NVQ2 or equiv -0.10 0.07 0.137
A-level/NVQ3 or equiv 0.06 0.09 0.523
NVQ4/NVQ5 or equiv -0.07 0.10 0.507
Degree/HNC/teacher training/nursing or equiv 0.11 0.08 0.181
PhD/DPhil or equiv 0.08 0.12 0.497
Age 0.00 0.00 0.490
Female 0.08 0.05 0.092
Household income -0.01 0.01 0.483
Left-right self-placement 0.07 0.02 0.000
Wales -0.12 0.10 0.258
Scotland -0.12 0.08 0.163
Approve of Britain’s involvement in Iraq 0.10 0.03 0.001
Adjusted R squared 0.54
SEE 1.13
Note: coefficients are unstandardized OLS coefficients; see the text of the paper and Appendix A for the
description of the variables and question wording; N=2386.
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Table 3. Political Trust and Attitudes to Immigration, ESS Results
b SE p
(Constant) 3.15 0.37 0.000
Immigration attitudes
Concern about impact of immigration on culture -0.10 0.02 0.000
Concern about impact of immigration on jobs -0.05 0.02 0.014
Economic Evaluations
Satisfied with present state of economy in country 0.27 0.02 0.000
Difficult to live on present income -0.07 0.06 0.206
Social Capital
Trust other people 0.23 0.02 0.000
Participation in voluntary activities 0.02 0.08 0.819
Electoral losers: Voted…
Party other than Labour -0.31 0.10 0.002
Did not vote -0.23 0.10 0.024
Other controls
Education
GCSE/O-level/CSE/NVQ1/NVQ2 or equiv 0.13 0.11 0.241
A-level/NVQ3 or equiv 0.09 0.15 0.545
NVQ4/NVQ5 or equiv -0.14 0.15 0.350
Degree/HNC/teacher training/nursing or equiv 0.07 0.13 0.573
PhD/DPhil or equiv -0.16 0.44 0.713
Age 0.00 0.00 0.110
Female 0.08 0.08 0.336
Household Income -0.01 0.02 0.723
Left-right self-placement 0.09 0.02 0.000
Scotland -0.15 0.13 0.244
Wales -0.05 0.15 0.720
Adj R2 0.29
SEE 1.56
Note: coefficients are unstandardized OLS coefficients; see the text of the paper and Appendix C for the
description of the variables and question wording; N=1707.
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Table 4. Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Concern about Immigration, ESS
2002-3
Regressor b SE p
No immigrant friends 0.28 0.06 0.000
Mind immigrant of different race/ethnicity from majority being
your boss 0.13 0.02 0.000
Qualification for immigration: speak country's official language 0.06 0.02 0.001
Qualification for immigration: committed to way of life in country 0.12 0.02 0.000
Qualification for immigration: be white 0.04 0.02 0.000
Most immigrants to country of different race/ethnic group as
majority 0.62 0.15 0.000
Immigrants from Europe: most from poor countries 0.33 0.16 0.043
Immigrants from outside Europe: most from poor countries 0.45 0.17 0.009
Standard Error of Regression 1.58
R-squared 0.33
Partial R-squared for excluded instruments 0.14
F-statistic for test of excluded instruments 42.84
F p-value 0.000
Note: coefficients are unstandardized OLS coefficients, controlling for all other exogenous predictors of
political trust (see Table 5); see the text of the paper and Appendix C for the description of the variables
and question wording; N=1600.
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Table 5. Political Trust and Attitudes to Immigration, ESS Results with
Instrumental Variables
b SE p
(Constant) 2.94 0.41 0.000
Immigration attitudes: Instrumental variable -0.14 0.05 0.004
Economic Evaluations
Satisfied with present state of economy in country 0.29 0.02 0.000
Difficult to live on present income -0.08 0.06 0.163
Social Capital
Trust other people 0.26 0.02 0.000
Participation in voluntary activities 0.06 0.08 0.474
Electoral losers: Voted…
Party other than Labour -0.34 0.10 0.001
Did not vote -0.29 0.10 0.006
Other controls
Education
GCSE/O-level/CSE/NVQ1/NVQ2 or equiv 0.13 0.12 0.257
A-level/NVQ3 or equiv 0.06 0.15 0.699
NVQ4/NVQ5 or equiv -0.15 0.16 0.334
Degree/HNC/teacher training/nursing or equiv 0.18 0.13 0.180
PhD/DPhil or equiv -0.07 0.44 0.869
Age 0.00 0.00 0.080
Female 0.09 0.08 0.257
Household Income -0.02 0.02 0.457
Left-right self-placement 0.09 0.03 0.000
Wales -0.07 0.15 0.631
Scotland -0.17 0.14 0.210
Adj R2 0.29
SEE 1.58
Note: coefficients are unstandardized OLS coefficients using instrumental variables; see the text of the
paper and Appendices B and C for the description of the variables and question wording; N=1619.
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Figure 1. Immigration and Political Trust, Interactive Effect
_______________________________________________________________________
Note: figure was created by substituting high, medium, and low values for the immigration variables while
holding all non-dichotomous variables at their means. All dichotomous variables (e.g., gender and region)
were set to 0.
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Figure 2. Marginal Effect of Concern about Immigration on Political Trust
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Matt Golder, ‘Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses’, Political Analysis 14
(2006), pp. 63-82; see also, http://homepages.nyu.edu/~mrg217/interaction.html#code, last accessed 4
June 2010.
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